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Abstract 
Candidate branding in political campaigns acts to convey the ideal image of a candidate molded 
to represent the specific characteristics important to that candidate’s constituency. Campaigns 
craft a brand around a variety of political and personal qualities and issues that define the 
candidate as the ideal representative, and simultaneously cast the opponent as the clear 
antithesis, of the constituency’s interests. Conveying the candidate’s brand through the media is 
an integral aspect to bringing the message to voters and driving turn out. However, in a media 
environment increasingly subservient to economic pressures to produce new, exciting, dramatic, 
and profitable coverage, a focus on issues and experience is lost in campaign coverage. This 
study seeks to identify what aspects of candidate brands are more likely to be conveyed through 
media coverage and what narratives posited by campaigns will be reflected in the news. In this 
case study of the 2014 U.S. senatorial race in Virginia between incumbent Democratic Senator 
Mark Warner and Republican challenger Ed Gillespie, media content analysis is used to detect 
how much and what aspects of each candidate’s brand is portrayed in media descriptions of the 
candidates and the campaign.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 During a campaign, candidates for political office seek to accomplish a single goal: 
convince the majority of their constituents to vote for them on Election Day. A number of tactics 
have been implemented, tested, and applied over time, yet the broadest and clearest explanation 
of campaign strategy remains the same: selling a candidate to voters as the person who will best 
represent and advocate for their interests while in office. A wide variety of methods are 
employed to explain to voters why a certain candidate meets this standard, but it must all begin 
with a coherent and carefully crafted brand that defines the candidate. A candidate’s brand 
consists of all the qualities upon which voters evaluate candidates: likability, professional ability, 
policy stances, and more come together to make up who and what the campaign wants the 
candidate to symbolize in the minds of voters.  
 While campaigns implement strategies to promote this and spread the message to voters, 
the media act as both an integral channel for and the largest obstacle to disseminating the brand. 
Most citizens obtain political information through the media, and the media does not portray 
candidates or promote brands verbatim from campaign messaging. This study shows that, in the 
case of the 2014 U.S. senatorial campaign in Virginia, the media’s portrayal of candidates does 
not match up perfectly with the brand created and disseminated by the campaigns. Through a 
media content analysis, the findings in this paper reveal that aspects of candidate brands that play 
into the media’s biases toward dramatic, antagonistic coverage and avoidance of in-depth policy 
coverage are likely to show up in media reports, but the media will not discuss candidates in the 
exact brand terms that campaigns posit. This study concludes that candidates who seek to project 
greater control over how campaign coverage is framed or what issues are discussed in coverage 
must manipulate their message to match media behaviors.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 Literature on branding in politics and media campaign coverage posit a number of ideas 
about how and why candidates craft brands, as well as how and why media cover campaigns. 
This literature review begins with a discussion of branding in politics, explaining the ways 
branding has been implemented in the political sphere. The leading ideas state that political 
branding grew alongside the permanent campaign, in that every move a politician makes must be 
understood as being crucial to their next election. Brands set the standards of a politician’s 
personal and professional qualities and the issues he or she advocates for in office. This brand is 
emphasized with every legislative vote, every floor speech, and every other political action that 
can be used to promote and expand a politician’s image.   
 The literature review then discusses political brands in the context where they are most 
useful: a campaign. Candidates use brands to define themselves and simultaneously set 
themselves in contrast to their opponent, a contrast that is often shown through partisan 
differentiations. The goal is to create an image of the ideal candidate for a certain constituency, 
while also creating the image of the opponent as the worst possible candidate for voters. 
However, literature of media campaign coverage then explains how the promotion of candidate 
brands often face a roadblock because media and candidates have diverging goals during a 
campaign. Candidates seek to sell themselves, while media seek to sell content. The former is 
done through carefully crafted messaging that posits an image of a capable representative 
focused on the constituency’s interests, and the latter is done through game frame coverage of 
dramatic battles between partisan opponents and campaign missteps.  
 The literature shows that political branding and campaign coverage both play a role in 
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heightening the partisan nature of campaigns. Candidates that wish to show a clear contrast 
between themselves and their opponent must often draw that contrast along partisan lines. 
Economic pressures force the media to create stories that sell, which are often partisan fights 
over divisive issues. The result is that the political information voters obtain is inundated with 
partisan divide. 
 The ideas presented in this literature raise the question of how these ideas of political 
branding and media coverage affected Virginia’s 2014 U.S. senatorial race. Senator Mark 
Warner’s brand of bipartisanship did not result in an easy victory, although that was expected 
and predicted by most polls. Literature on Virginia politics shows an increasing partisan divide 
in the state, begging the question of whether highly partisan-based brands are more likely to see 
media coverage reflect the ideas that brand posits and whether that plays a role in driving more 
voters to the polls on Election Day.  
Political Branding  
Candidate branding in politics proliferated rapidly in the past two decades, infiltrating the 
operations and ultimate missions of political parties, representatives, and candidates. The 
expansion of media capabilities and reach and the subsequent dissemination of information on a 
wider and more continuous basis elicited a reaction from political actors to craft strategic 
“messages” that build support and promote their image. The evolution of political branding grew 
parallel to that of the “permanent campaign,” in which politicians constantly seek to strengthen 
their public image and gain greater support from their constituents, as well as the greater public 
if said politician’s trajectory includes higher office. Branding emerged as a necessity to maintain 
the “transitory opinions of voters whose support must be cultivated continuously through 
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communication.”1 Every political action must be considered a contribution to a politician’s 
image and must be communicated as an example of constituent loyalty, political success, and 
issue identification, making branding “a critical part of what are considered the primary 
functions of government.”2 
 Branding is incorporated into every politician’s communication strategy. The job of a 
politician’s communications office is to develop and execute initiatives that support, enhance, 
and disseminate the politician’s brand to the public. This is done mainly through media channels, 
considering media act as the main and most commonly used link between the public and the 
political world. The goal of branding is to create an image in the mind of citizens that can be 
accepted and reinforced with every political maneuver. “A brand, therefore, does not constitute 
what a product is but what the consumers perceive it to be…However, at the end of the day, the 
brand is the projection of a product in consumers’ minds. It is there where it can be cultivated but 
also contaminate.”3 Branding is a definition of a politician’s abilities and achievements intended 
to convince the voting public of the representative’s successful tenure of advocating for and 
helping the citizens.  
 A political brand represents a strict framework that defines the politician’s leadership, 
demeanor, and beliefs, and all messaging falls in line with and helps enhance the brand.4 
Branding remains most imperative and useful during campaigns, in which it sets a strict standard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 David Swanson, “Transnational Trends in Political Communication: Conventional Views and New 
Realities,” in Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges, Frank Esser and Barbara 
Pfetsch eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 50. 
 
 2 Ibid., 50 
 
 3 Manuel Adolphsen, “Branding in Election Campaigns: Just a Buzzword or a New Quality of Political 
Communication” (MSc dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009), 5. Emphasis in 
original. 
 
 4 Ibid., 2. 
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of “external presentation” that the campaign can continue to emphasize and essentially “sell” the 
candidate to the public in order to gain votes.5 In the same way branding is used in the marketing 
of consumer products, political campaigns strategically build and promote brands in order to 
convince the voting public to vote for their candidate.  
 Therefore, in a political campaign, the main goal of branding is to define the candidate 
positively, and, in turn, attempt to define the opponent negatively. Messaging and branding exist 
as “the communication of value-laden, emotional narratives tailored to specific groups with the 
aim of differentiating identical products.”6 A political brand is made up of a variety of factors 
that define the politician, differentiates him or her from the opponent, and thus acts to define the 
opponent as well. Candidate brands perpetually serve a dual purpose: to “construct their image, 
and deconstruct their opponents.”7 
Candidate brands break down into two main categories: brand differentiators and 
boundary conditions.8 Brand differentiators are “the emotional wrapping and personality traits” 
that encompass a candidate’s brand.9 These aspects of a candidate’s brand focus on ability, 
experience, and qualities of leadership, amongst other personal and professional descriptors. The 
role of brand differentiators is to paint a clear contrast between the candidate promoting these 
qualities and his or her opponent. Brand differentiators are the main characteristics of a brand 
that simultaneously define the candidate and opponent. For example, when a brand describes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5 Ibid., 2-3. 
 
 6 Ibid., 6. 
 
7 Jennifer Stromer-Galley, Presidential Campaigning in the Internet Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 147. 
 
8 Ibid., 20. 
 
9 Ibid., 24. 
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candidate as experienced, trustworthy, or knowledgeable, it draws a contrast, either implicitly or 
explicitly, against the opponent and labels the opponent as inexperienced, untrustworthy, and 
unknowledgeable. Boundary conditions consist of policy areas and issues that the candidate 
promotes in a brand. A policy can be emphasized in a brand or simply mentioned as an 
“umbrella topic;” either way, both make up the boundary conditions and contribute to the brand 
the candidate is selling to constituents.10 Candidates attach boundary conditions to their name in 
order to convey what policies they have experience working with and what issues they will 
advocate for in elected office. If candidates discuss plans for addressing economic issues, or if 
candidates promote the work they have done in furthering LGBT issues, these qualify as 
boundary conditions. In political brands, boundary conditions are emphasized so that voters 
associate certain values with the candidates in their mind.  
 If a brand stands as the conglomerate of qualities and ideals that formulate the image of a 
politician, then the strategy of messaging can best be understood as the means of disseminating 
this brand to constituents. In the modern environment of permanent campaigns, “a politician’s 
life in US politics, then, is a lengthy sequence of communicative extravaganzas made up of 
events in long, long chains punctuated by elections.”11 The permanent campaign forces 
politicians to supplement their brand continually with actions that support the image they create. 
This is accomplished through continued messaging of a politician’s policy agenda, votes, 
speeches, and actions in Washington. When the candidate is elected and becomes the incumbent, 
the permanent campaign urges said politician to continue promoting, emphasizing, and 
contributing to the brand crafted during their time as the candidate, as re-election is never far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 10 Ibid., 20. 
 
11 Michael Silverstein, “The ‘message’ in the (political) battle,” Language and Communication 31 (2011): 
204. 
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away.  
 During an initial campaign, the crafted brand is simply “the characterological aura of a 
person…who has not only said and done things, but who has the potential…to be imaginable as 
acting in certain ways in situations still unrealized.”12 In a brand’s early stages, most often during 
the candidate’s first campaign, the candidate is creating the idea of how he or she may act in 
office based of certain positions and applicable experience or knowledge. For this reason, it is 
more challenging for an incumbent to maintain the brand over time, as the imagined scenarios 
become reality.13 
 As messaging proliferates in campaigns, the focus becomes more dedicated to developing 
“one’s own positive message and/or to develop one’s opponent’s negative message.”14 
Candidates compete for ownership over specific issues as a part of their brand, and in 
campaigning, ownership is most successful when a candidate frames the issue as something they 
are “better able to ‘handle’ than their opponent.”15 In turn, positive branding for oneself and 
negative branding for one’s opponent is a major contributor to the strong partisan polarization of 
modern campaigns because candidates often define one another by tapping into party 
differentiations through rhetoric that “stands in sharp contrast to that of the other party.”16  
 Whether intentional or not, voters rely on party affiliation as a main evaluator of 
candidates, “regardless of whether individual candidates draw attention to their partisan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Ibid. 
 
 14 Ibid., 205. 
 
15 J.R. Petrocik, “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study,” American Journal of 
Political Science 40, no. 3 (1996), 826. 
 
 16 Ibid. 
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affiliation on the campaign trail.”17 Additionally, “party labels also function as filters to the 
information contained in candidates’ communications to voters.”18 As a symbol, political parties 
offer easily accessible and continually reinforced images in the minds of voters that are 
emphasized and reaffirmed constantly by both elite political actors and media. For this reason, an 
understanding of a political party, whether as direct messaging from the party or as information 
filtered through media, is engrained in the minds of most citizens and therefore citizens easily 
and automatically conflate the qualities of the party with the affiliated politicians and candidates. 
When voters, especially those who tend to vote straight ticket, evaluate candidates, party is often 
used as a proxy for the candidate as the main source of information acquisition.   
 It is difficult, therefore, for voters to differentiate between candidates and their affiliated 
party in regard to issues and policy, even if a candidate’s brand emphasizes areas of 
disagreement with his or her party’s brand. Voters, often unconsciously, use party labels to 
predict “legislative behavior”19 because political parties have built their brands over years and 
have had more time to solidify and spread their brand than a new candidate does.20 As discussed 
earlier, campaigns focus on ideas and predictions of how a candidate will act or vote once in 
office and faced with a specific issue. Therefore, in terms of issue ownership, it is easier to 
convince a voter of how a candidate will act by invoking the hardened schemata of party position 
and issue beliefs.21 When candidates break from party-owned issues, it is harder to sell to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17 Jacob R. Neiheisel and Sarah Niebler, “The Use of Party Brand Labels in Congressional Election 
Campaigns,” Legislative Studies Quarterly (2013), 378. 
  
 18 Ibid.: 379. 
 
 19 Jeffrey D. Grynaviski, Partisan Bonds: Political Reputations and Legislative Accountability (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 71.  
 
 20 Arbour, “Issue Frame Ownership”: 608. 
  
 21 Ibid. 
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public because such disagreement seems unlikely, and few voters are likely to be focused enough 
on the campaign to view the candidate as aligned with their party on some issues but rebuking it 
on others.22 It is simpler for a voter to view the candidate along party lines, a factor that is 
usually played up by the opponent, especially a challenger facing an incumbent.  
 The power of party branding is undeniable in terms of its expansive reach and 
overarching effect. The strategy of party branding is identified as having originated with “party 
communication relied on ‘great mobilizing ideals.’”23 However, the effects of branding were 
realized and eventually trickled down into an “individualistic sell of candidate and party” on 
campaigns.24 Campaigns began to center around marketing both the party’s brand as a whole, in 
an attempt to win as many seats as possible, while also identifying and emphasizing an 
individual candidate’s brand that applies to a specific constituency. Political branding emerged 
as a partisan strategy, a way to sell the party to voters, yet national parties still rely on the selling 
of individual candidates to win as many elections as possible. In essence, party branding is one 
factor of an individual campaign, which is then usually elevated by the individual candidate’s 
brand.  
 Consistency in message is a useful tool in confirming prior beliefs and maintaining voter 
loyalty, “but if the party is erratic and constantly changes its platforms, then new information 
may increase uncertainty so that the party label conveys no useful information that could inform 
voter choice.”25 Most voters who are not considered amongst the most “politically informed and 
involved” desire campaigns “where citizens are provided with simple cues and clear choices that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 22 Ibid. 
 
 23 Swanson, “Transnational Trends in Political Communication,” 47. 
 
 24 Adolphsen, “Branding in Election Campaigns”: 11. 
 
25 Grynaviski, Partisan Bonds, 69. 
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require minimal time and effort to make.”26 Additionally, low-information voters tend to make 
voting decisions “by taking informational shortcuts, based on candidate cues,” such as race, 
gender, or party affiliation.27 This pathway to a voting decision is often used in elections where 
there is little information on the candidates or the race.28 National party brands are useful in these 
situations because when party brands provide a consistent message over time it confirms certain 
ideals and qualities that voters immediately associate with candidates in that party.  
 The tension between party affiliation and individual branding emerges as a point of 
contention in a number of circumstances. Candidates struggle to craft a brand that represents 
them as “simultaneously individuals and members of political parties.”29 Candidates will often 
diverge from their party on issues specific to a single faction in that politician’s constituency. 
However, in times of low approval numbers, a national party may see more candidates diverge 
on some of the party’s major issues or policies. As the 2014 midterm elections approached, 
President Barack Obama faced extremely low approval ratings, and some of his administration’s 
major policies were viewed with growing rancor by many across the nation. Democrats in a 
number of races attempted to distance themselves from the President, while Republicans worked 
to tie their opponents to the President.30 In candidate branding, a divergence from party brand is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Keena Lipsitz, Christine Trost, Matthew Grossman and John Sides, “What Voters Want from Political 
Campaign Communication,” Political Communication 22 (2005): 351. 
 
27 Monika L. McDermott, “Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections,” Political Research 
Quarterly 51, no. 4 (1998), 895. 
 
28 Ibid., 898. 
 
 29 Neiheisel and Niebler, “The Use of Party Brand Labels”, 394. 
 
 30 Jim Kuhnhenn and Darlene Superville, “Obama Doesn’t Want The Midterm Elections To Be About 
Him,” Associated Press, (October 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/09/obama-midterm-
elections_n_5961036.html. In a September 2014 AP-GfK poll, President Obama’s national approval ratings stood at 
44 percent approval and 51 percent disapproval. Amongst his major policies, 40 percent approved and 58 percent 
disapproved of “his handling of the economy,” and 41 percent approved and 58 percent disapproved of “his 
handling of health care.”  
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harder to solidify in the minds of voters because they are unlikely to pay close attention to the 
issues in campaigns and challengers are more likely to emphasize partisan differentiations.  
 Political campaigns are one of the largest contributors to “inter-party animus.”31 Though 
not the sole contributor to modern polarization, campaigns generally consist of partisan attacks 
that are emphasized by the game frame obsessed media.32 As the permanent campaign became 
the norm, partisan branding escalated in scale and frequency, and media followed suit in 
presenting almost all political events as a brawl between the two parties. The rise of longer, more 
prevalent campaigns throughout the year rather than during only a few short months resulted in a 
higher amount of horse race coverage.33 
Media Campaign Coverage 
News outlets are both a key asset and the greatest barrier to politicians and 
communication offices attempting to disseminate their strategically crafted brand to voters in a 
widespread manner. To some extent, media often pander to political frames, a relationship 
known as the indexing theory. Indexing claims “the mainstream news generally stays within the 
sphere of official consensus and conflict displayed in the public statements of the key 
government officials who manage the policy areas and decision-making processes that make the 
news.”34 Indexing is a result of reliance, ease, and professional standards and competition, 
amongst other factors. The lack of funds and resources for media outlets, coupled with the speed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 31 Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective 
on Polarization,” Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2012), 427. 
 
 32 Ibid., 427. 
 
33 Kyu Hahn, Shanto Iyengar and Helmut Norpoth, “Consumer Demand for Election News: The Horserace 
Sells,” Journal of Politics 66 (2004): 4. 
 
34 W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence. and Steven Livingston, When the Press Fails: Political Power 
and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 49. 
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and urgency of the 24-hour news cycle, forces media to generate stories in a quick and efficient 
manner. The result is an increased reliance on political sources who want to be featured in the 
story or want a sounding board for their brand. Media rely increasingly on press releases, 
prepared statements, and other tools produced by political press offices because they are 
obtainable, do not require time-consuming and expensive research, and can help reporters 
produce a story quickly.  
 Additionally, the reliance on major political figures and media’s tendency to relay a press 
office’s framing of issues also stems from the societal pressure to both remain objective and 
produce credible news. The public expects media outlets to contain widely known, and thus 
perceived credible, sources. This often results in a major focus on the frames of politicians and 
political offices rather than counter-frames of unknown groups.35 As a result, indexing posits that 
political figures largely determine how coverage is framed because the public desires credible 
sources, and media relay the perceived credible frames as a matter of professional standards and 
economic competition. All media outlets want their coverage to be consumed by as many people 
as possible, and that requires pandering to the public’s preferences and expectations.  
 Indexing is also caused in large part by the profit incentive that affects almost all media 
behaviors currently. The drop in actual purchasing of news resulted in large cuts to media 
personnel and resources. As a result, journalists need to produce new content quickly and 
cheaply in order to remain ahead of competition. Economic demands cause journalists to rely 
heavily on press releases and prepared comments from elite sources because they are readily 
available and provide a story that costs little in time and labor and is thus more profitable. 
Politicians are aware of the constraints journalists face in the modern media era and carefully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 35 Ibid. 
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churn out “information subsidies” to journalists in order to ensure the news reflects their 
message.36 
 Literature analyzing campaign coverage echoes the ideas put forth in indexing theory, 
stating that professional journalists understand their role in “broadcasting” the message, as “this 
is the stuff of political reporting, operating completely within the envelope essentially as trade 
professionals.”37 Indexing influences campaign coverage because the focus must always be on 
the candidates, or the political elite. Media are not likely to seek an outside source in a story 
centered on two candidates. As political opponents seeking to define themselves and each other, 
the candidates already provide frames and counter-frames, essentially filling the “objectiveness” 
that media seek. Additionally, a campaign story that does not feature a candidate’s stance or 
response “would lessen or even erase their [the reporter’s] functional value to their employers.”38 
Journalists covering campaigns thus “learn to live in the parameters that the currently evolved 
system of ‘message’-ing offers to them,” lest they be rendered uninformative, lacking credibility, 
and useless.39  
 However, indexing does not mean that a politician’s brand is necessarily dominant or 
even featured in media coverage. While elite political actors may have an upper hand in how 
coverage is framed, reporters also have some latitude to set the issue agenda, which may differ 
from the policy issues that make up the boundary conditions of a politician’s brand. The issues 
emphasized by media are often “assigned greater importance” in the public’s mind than issues 
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not prevalent in news coverage.40  
 Agenda setting seeps into campaign coverage in a variety of ways, the most prominent 
and most important being that the campaign, as a whole, is covered in a horse-race style. In 
essence, during campaigns “the press concentrates on the strategic game played by the 
candidates in their pursuit” of political office, which leaves policy discussion and analysis as 
either secondary or completely forgotten aspects of a campaign.41 The result is a greater focus on 
strategy, polling, and opponent attacks rather than individual policy stances, leadership qualities, 
or overall political capabilities.42 Campaign coverage is overwhelmed with the competition of 
who is ahead and who is behind at any given moment in the campaign, commonly depicted 
through polling stories. Much of a candidate’s brand is filtered out through this type of coverage, 
yet what can often remain are the aspects of messaging that seek to define the opponent through 
attacks or new developments.  
 The rise of horse-race coverage is not necessarily reflective of the public’s desires, but it 
is reflective of its choices.43 The rise of 24-hour news requires new developments to be available 
on a constant basis, and thus “new polls are conducted every day to provide constant updates 
regarding the fortunes of each candidate.”44 Policy is rarely present in campaign coverage 
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because developments and the push-and-pull of campaigns “have a special appeal to the press in 
part because they conform with traditional news values—they are unexpected, colorful, and 
unique.”45 A main goal of media is to present what is new. As a result, “issues may slip from 
view because candidates often have nothing new to say about them.”46 Instead, reporters will 
look to aspects of the campaign that change on a daily basis and present fresh information. Horse 
race stories are easy to produce, and they are easy to sell. Additionally, the public seeks horse 
race coverage because it provides a clear, simple idea of who will win and is not bogged down 
by excess information regarding policy or campaign strategy.47  
Stories that cover poll ratings more often than not relay no information regarding policy, 
experience, or capabilities. Poll reporting leaves little space for the qualities of political brands, 
nor is that aspect essential for the reporting. In fact, articles on new polls are not likely to even 
contain a candidate’s statement regarding the development unless they are truly substantial and 
game-changing numbers. Most candidates try to spin the results of a poll in their favor, yet 
articles on polls usually focus solely on numbers. If analysis is present, it usually consists of 
discussion on strategy, recent developments in the campaign, or what this says about what may 
happen next. A candidate’s brand has little opportunity to display itself in poll coverage. Voters 
favor the perceived objectivity of polling and the fact that horse race stories do not tend to offer 
the messaging from candidates that many citizens find to be “insincere.”48  
 Through horse race coverage, media fail to relay important issue information, yet agenda 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 45 Patterson, Mass Media Election, 36. 
 
 46 Peter Clarke and Susan H. Evans, Covering Campaigns: Journalism in Congressional Elections 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1983), 48. 
 
47 Hahn, Iyengar and Norpoth, “The Horserace Sells.” 
 
48 Hahn, Iyengar and Norpoth, “The Horserace Sells”: 30. 
 
17	  
	  
setting can affect whether some topics actually gain focus in campaign coverage. Certain issues 
are present in coverage of campaigns, but “that reporters and candidates have different issue 
biases can be seen in part when issue news initiated by reporters is compared with that initiated 
by candidates.”49 Agenda setting comes into play in that, during a campaign, whatever topic 
rules the news day will often be placed in the context of the campaign by seeking the candidates’ 
stances on the issue. Additionally, whatever topic is driving national news during a campaign 
will tend to be a main issue in the campaign, even if it is not a priority set by either candidate. 
National news sets the agenda for what is considered the most important story or issue of the 
day. That topic filters down to local or state coverage, which causes reporters to insert the 
national story into the campaign. A tangential concept idea to agenda setting is priming, in which 
the issues covered in the news tend to be the issues citizens use to evaluate a politician’s 
performance.50 Regardless of what candidates emphasize, citizens will typically evaluate them in 
the context of major issues in news coverage, ultimately affecting how a citizen will vote.  
 Candidate brands and media agenda are “markedly different.”51 Brands are not likely to 
be used continually in news coverage because they do not possess the “qualities prized in news 
stories.”52 Brands are specific and strategically detailed to contain the exact aspects of policy and 
leadership qualities that define the candidate in a positive light. Political brands are carefully and 
specifically crafted and therefore cannot fit into every story, especially breaking news stories. 
For example, an economy-centered brand has little relevance in a story on foreign policy. If the 
boundary conditions of a candidate’s brand do not mirror the policy issues at the top of the news 
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agenda at the moment, then it will be nearly impossible for a candidate to have the central 
aspects of his or her brand emphasized in news stories.  
 Candidates must work with the media’s agenda because otherwise they would be left out 
of the conversation completely. When specific campaign issues arise or a singular story begins to 
dominate the news, candidates have “little choice but to confront the problem…that the press 
refuses to ignore.”53 In campaign coverage, candidates and journalists have different priorities 
and different biases that affect their actions. On a professional level, candidates are attempting to 
promote themselves and their brand while journalists are striving to remain objective and 
nonpartisan in their reporting. In a more realistic analysis, candidates want to discuss their 
message and accomplishments, while reporters and media outlets want to sell content. The result 
is that candidates tend to focus on issues and ideology more than media do, and reporters 
emphasize “party affiliation” and “campaign organization” more frequently than candidates.54 As 
a whole, campaign coverage becomes focused on the partisan differentiations put forth by the 
candidates, and thus the public receives and interprets coverage through a partisan context.  
The Virginia Political Environment 
 Virginia offers a useful example when it comes to studying the effects of intense partisan 
polarization in modern campaigns. The Commonwealth’s status in the 21st century is that of a 
“swing state,” yet recent electoral results have shown Virginia’s demography to be divided both 
geographically and along party lines. President Barack Obama carried the Commonwealth in 
2008 and 2012, and as of 2015, all statewide offices are held by Democrats.55 However, as a 
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result of strategically gerrymandered districts, Republicans control the Commonwealth’s General 
Assembly, making up 21 of 40 state Senators and 67 of 100 members in the House of 
Delegates.56 The obvious divide in party identification in Virginia is better understood when 
looking at the demographic makeup of the populations in different areas of Virginia.  
 The Commonwealth’s partisan divide is easily detectable “between rural and white 
voters, who form the Republican Party’s base, and urban and non-white who overwhelming[ly] 
support Democratic candidates.”57 The result of this divide is that while Republican-leaning 
citizens make up the largest geographic space in Virginia, the population of rural Southwest 
Virginia is minimal compared to the populous cities and counties that Democrats tend to carry.58 
Cartographic analyses of statewide elections reveal that Virginia is made up of large numbers of 
Democratic voters, yet the partisan gerrymandering of districts allowed Republicans to continue 
controlling the General Assembly by isolating their core opponents in a minority of districts.59 
Very few candidates in Virginia face competitive elections as a result. In the last two elections 
for Virginia’s House of Delegates, in 2011 and 2013, only 17 of the 200 races in total were 
competitive, “meaning a victory margin of less than 10 percentage points. In 129 of those 200 
races, the winning Republican or Democrat faced no opposition from the other major party. And 
in the 71 contests where a Democrat and Republican did square off, most were blowouts, with an 
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average victory margin 20 percentage points.”60  
 Therefore, statewide candidates must brand themselves strongly alongside partisan lines 
in order to drive the turnout necessary to swing the state in their favor. In order to win a Virginia 
election, candidates have to fight over the “swing-county suburbs,”61 with their less distinctive or 
reliable demographics, while also pandering heavily to their party’s brand in order to galvanize 
partisan turnout. Recent elections showed Democrats winning by small margins due to the votes 
of the more populous cities.  
 The power of partisan campaigning in Virginia is no more obvious than in the results of 
Senator Mark Warner’s 2014 senatorial re-election campaign. Senator Warner, a widely popular 
Virginia politician since his days as Governor in the early 2000s, built widespread support due to 
his record of bipartisanship. However, despite nearly every poll placing Senator Warner ahead of 
Republican challenger Ed Gillespie by a wide margin, the final results were shockingly close, 
with Senator Warner winning by just 0.8 percent of the vote.62 Analysis following the race 
culminated on two main factors: “one, incumbent Sen. Mark Warner's (D-Va.) political scientists 
didn't get his people to the polls and, two, that the people who did go were less likely to vote for 
the Democrat.”63 Between the 2012 and 2014 elections, Virginia voter turnout decreased by the 
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largest margins in some of the most populous cities, “particularly in the Northeast, [which] 
overlaps with where much of the Democratic growth in the state has been over the last decade.”64 
Democratic voters did not turn out in 2014, making the race much closer than expected. 
 The question following the election was why Democratic voters failed to turn out in large 
numbers as they did in the 2012 presidential campaign. Although voter participation is always 
significantly lower in midterm elections, the notable turnout for the Republican Party raised 
concerns about a downfall in Democratic voter turnout efforts. Many attributed this to the way 
Senator Warner campaigned. In his 2001 gubernatorial race and 2008 senatorial race, the 
Virginia electorate was very different. Senator Warner won those elections by landslides through 
promoting a “radical centrist” brand. He emphasized the same moderate image in the 2014 
election, but rural and Southwest Virginia counties were more assuredly Republican and less 
likely to swing blue.65 The increased partisan frustration with President Barack Obama that 
affected nearly every election in the 2014 midterms, and Ed Gillespie’s stringent effort to frame 
Senator Warner as in-line with Obama, helped push the Republican voters to turn out in large 
numbers. Conversely, Senator Warner’s moderate image failed to inspire core Democratic voters 
to hit the polls in large quantities in the way more liberal candidates like Obama and Governor 
Terry McAuliffe’s campaigns did. Overall, it appeared Gillespie’s campaigning, based heavily in 
partisan attacks, helped him secure a close race, while Senator Warner’s avoidance of partisan 
alignment almost cost him re-election.  
Summary 
 Branding affects the political communication strategy in a number of ways, most notably 
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by contributing to a proliferation of partisan campaigning and an expansion of campaign 
messaging into daily politics. The game frame obsessed media exacerbates partisan polarization 
in citizens by emphasizing and confirming partisan frames on a continuous basis. Regardless of 
whether a politician’s brand attempts to play off partisan identity or distance themselves from 
their party, partisanship stands out as an inescapable aspect of campaign rhetoric, a type of 
rhetoric that has seeped into almost every politician’s brand. Even when politicians emphasize 
issues in their brands, the power of national party’s issue ownership infiltrates the brand in the 
minds of voters. It is through the combination of the media’s game frame coverage, lack of 
policy focus, and the public’s solidified understandings of partisan issue ownership that 
individualized political branding fails to implant itself in the minds of citizens. As a result, 
branding must focus heavily on partisan rhetoric in order to gain recognition in media and draw 
the support of voters in large numbers.  
 
HYPOTHESES: 
- Media coverage is more likely to reflect Ed Gillespie’s definition of Senator Mark 
Warner as a partisan politician than Senator Warner’s definition of himself as a 
bipartisan politician.  
 
- Media coverage will emphasize instances when Senator Mark Warner breaks from his 
brand of bipartisanship.  
 
- Media coverage will highlight health care as a major issue in the campaign more so than 
any other policy issue.  
 
- Media coverage will emphasize attacks between candidates rather than actual policy 
proposals.  
 
METHODS 
To review, a political brand is the image that candidates want portrayed to voters. The 
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brand crafted by each candidate is the set of qualities and issues that they want voters to 
associate them with in their mind. Candidates seek to achieve this association through strategic 
messaging of their brand to voters in a number of ways, with media acting as a main channel of 
communication between candidate and constituent. Therefore, this study seeks to identify what 
image of each candidate is actually portrayed to voters through news reports. Media content 
analysis is the best process for this study because it generates quantitative empirical results that 
are then analyzed to make verifiable and justifiable claims based on hard evidence. To ensure 
that this study is as objective as possible, strict standards ensured that the methods of coding 
used could be duplicated and results could be reproduced and verified. 
 The methods used in this study are based in large part on the standards set by Thomas 
Pepinsky and Stephen Kosack in their text, “How to Code.”66 The procedure put forth in their 
article lays out guidelines to ensure coding analysis is clear and verifiable. Pepinsky and Kosack 
propose four main components of a strong and reputable content analysis: “theory, clarity, 
generality, and replicability."67 Determining and specifying the theory is the most integral aspect 
of crafting a strong content analysis. Theory explains “(1) what the concept being defined is, and 
(2) what its possible values are.”68 The concept studied in this paper is political branding, and the 
values of political brands are identified in literature as brand differentiators and boundary 
conditions.69 These two categories capture and define the main qualities politicians use political 
brands to promote. Brands are meant to sell candidates and therefore aim to show voters a 
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candidate’s political characteristics and policy stances.  
Political brands can be defined by a number of terms or phrases, so it was vital to set 
strict parameters of what specific brand qualities would be coded for and what terms and phrases 
would indicate the presence of these qualities. The focus of this study is to determine if the 
brands created and touted by the candidates of Virginia’s 2014 U.S. senatorial race were 
reflected in media coverage of the race. Therefore, I began my analysis by conducting an 
inductive measurement of each candidate’s brand, and I created a codebook based on the brand 
differentiators and boundary conditions identified through that preliminary assessment [See 
Appendix A].  
 To conduct this initial analysis, I chose two documents from each candidate that strongly 
represented their brand. I coded the pages on both incumbent Democratic Senator Mark Warner 
and Republican challenger Ed Gillespie’s campaign websites that laid out their major platforms 
for the campaign. I then coded each candidate’s op-ed contribution to the Richmond Times-
Dispatch on November 1, 2014, in which each candidate wrote a final summation of their 
candidacy and push for votes. I chose to use these two documents for my inductive measurement 
because they support the idea that a political brand is crafted and closely adhered to throughout 
the campaign, as the former was created at the beginning and the latter at the end of the 
campaign, yet both reiterate many of the same qualities of the respective brand. Additionally, 
analyzing the documents from the beginning and end of the campaign show what aspects of a 
candidate’s brand changed during the campaign.  
 The inductive measurement of these documents is what makes up the codebook I used in 
order to detect if media coverage relayed the brands put forth by each candidate. I identified 
major themes and qualities present in each candidate’s brand and defined the terms and phrases 
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that would represent the presence of these qualities in coding of news articles. The codebook 
created allowed for specific analysis so that, while coding, the standards were that when I 
observe “X” it represents value “Y.” For example, when reading a news article that mentions 
Senator Mark Warner worked on a certain policy or legislation, it indicates the presence of 
“Policy Knowledge/Strength” in Senator Warner’s brand, or when an article mentions Ed 
Gillespie’s argument of repealing and replacing Obamacare, it indicates “Health Care” in 
Gillespie’s brand. Articles were coded as either having the brand quality present in the report (1) 
or not having any representation of that brand quality (0). Additionally, each article was coded 
separately for each candidate.  
The codebook is divided by the two main categories of brands outlined in political 
branding literature. Brand differentiators define a brand as individualistic and are used to set the 
candidate apart from competitors. Brand differentiators encapsulate the personal and professional 
qualities that candidates use to define themselves and simultaneously define their opponent. For 
example, when Mark Warner touts his political experience as a former governor and sitting 
Senator, he is not only telling voters that he has a successful background in public office, but he 
is also highlighting that his experience is more substantial than that of his opponent, Ed 
Gillespie.  
However, the polarity aspect of brand differentiators is not always explicit. Though Mark 
Warner may be implicitly contrasting his experience against Ed Gillespie’s in this example, he is 
not explicitly criticizing Gillespie’s lack of experience in public office. Therefore, explicit 
references to an opponent are coded as defining the opposing candidate, while implicit references 
are coded as only defining the politician speaking. For example, when Ed Gillespie states, “My 
five-point agenda for growth would be the polar opposite of the failed philosophy of diminished 
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expectations we have endured for the last five years with Mark Warner and President Obama,”70 
brand differentiators are coded for both candidates because Gillespie is explicitly defining 
himself and Warner in this statement. This phrase would be coded as “Policy 
Knowledge/Strength” under Gillespie’s brand and “Partisan” under Mark Warner’s brand 
because Gillespie is stating that he has a strong plan for growth while coupling Warner with 
President Obama and identifying them as partisan allies. Additionally, this would be coded as an 
“Opponent Failure” brand differentiator under Gillespie’s brand because he is explicitly 
criticizing Warner’s abilities and thus defining himself as the better candidate in comparison. A 
converse example would be when Mark Warner says, “I was in business longer than I have been 
in elected office. I know how to read a balance sheet. I know that when making business 
decisions, all options have to be on the table.”71 This would be coded as “Private Sector 
Experience” and “Policy Knowledge/Strength” brand differentiators under Warner’s brand, but 
nothing would be coded under Gillespie’s brand because Warner is not explicitly defining 
Gillespie or clearly stating a contrast in their abilities.  
Boundary conditions are any issue that a candidate highlights in their brand as a way to 
show what values and beliefs they will advocate for as a representative. Candidates use boundary 
conditions to attach their names to certain policies and values that they support, have experience 
handling, or have plans to address. Campaigns are often about values, and therefore it is 
important for politicians to identify a number of values that they will uphold and support if 
elected. Boundary conditions are usually only used to define a candidate’s attachment to a 
certain issue, but they are sometimes used to insert an opponent’s stance into the public 
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conversation. For example, in this race, Gillespie continually brought up and criticized Senator 
Warner’s vote and support for the Affordable Care Act, but media often did not mention 
Gillespie’s own idea for policy changes or alternatives, focusing solely on the attack. Therefore, 
this is an instance where Gillespie successfully attached a boundary condition to his opponent’s 
brand, but failed to attach himself to the topic. In these instances, “Health Care” is coded as a 
boundary condition for Warner’s brand but not Gillespie’s. When Gillespie’s reform stance is 
mentioned, such as his desire to “repeal and replace” the legislation, “Health Care” is coded as a 
boundary condition for both candidates.       
 I collected articles from the Washington Post and the Richmond Times-Dispatch, two of 
the most widely circulated daily newspapers in Virginia. I decided to code articles between the 
dates of October 1, 2014 and November 1, 2014 in order to limit the amount of articles in the 
study and due to the fact that the final month of a campaign is arguably the most closely covered 
time of the campaign. Additionally, voters are often most attentive to campaigns in the final 
weeks leading up to Election Day on November 4, 2014, making this month the most crucial for 
the presentation and dissemination of a brand to constituents.72 Articles including any mention of 
Mark Warner or Ed Gillespie during this time period were collected and coded as part of this 
study. Articles greater than 150 words from News, Metro, and Style sections were coded, yet 
news briefs, wrap-ups, opinion pieces, and editorials were not included. Contributions from other 
outlets, such as Politifact Virginia or the Associated Press that were published in the Washington 
Post and the Richmond Times-Dispatch were included and coded. Finally, articles from both 
print and online versions were included and coded for this analysis. The current environment in 
which media and political communication teams operate necessitated the inclusion of online 
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articles in this study. Oftentimes, after a piece is published, communication teams will reach out 
to provide a response statement or insist on a correction. This change is inserted online, but is 
often too late to be included in the print version. Therefore, the online versions of articles offer 
the most accurate assessment of whether campaigns were successful at inserting their brand into 
coverage. Additionally, more citizens now access news through online formats than print.73 
Since the goal of this study is to analyze the image of candidates that media coverage conveys to 
voters, it would be impractical to not include the main medium through which constituents 
receive their political information.    
 Overall, there was a disparity between coverage of the candidates themselves. Mark 
Warner was mentioned in 100 percent of Richmond Times-Dispatch articles coded and 88.2 
percent of Washington Post articles coded, whereas Ed Gillespie was only mentioned in 76.5 
percent of Richmond Times-Dispatch articles and 79.4 percent of Washington Post articles [See 
Table 1].  
 Intercoder reliability was tested with the assistance of a peer researcher. The peer was 
given the codebook and was explained the process and parameters of coding for this project. The 
peer then coded six articles, the first three from each news outlet. There were only four instances 
when the peer’s coding diverged from my own. Therefore, 152 out of 156 terms coded were the 
same between coders, resulting in an intercoder reliability measurement of 97 percent.  
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 Comparing the two candidates’ political brands (determined through the preliminary 
inductive measurement) revealed immediate differentiations between the ways each structured 
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their campaign message. Brand differentiators showed key differences between how each 
candidate campaigned and sought to frame the race. Brand differentiators are evaluated through 
percentages because there are fewer variables under this label, and thus it is easier to assess the 
emphasis candidates placed on each aspect of boundary conditions by viewing percentages [See 
Table 2 and Table 3]. Priority for boundary conditions is determined based on whether the issue 
was mentioned in one or both of the texts used to measure the candidates’ political brands. If a 
boundary condition is only mentioned in one text, it is assigned “Low” priority; if a boundary 
condition is mentioned in both texts, it is assigned “High” priority [See Table 4 and Table 5]. 
Amongst his brand differentiators, Senator Mark Warner emphasized political experience 
and bipartisanship [See Table 2], while Ed Gillespie pushed the partisan differentiations between 
himself and his opponent and focused his brand as a critical assault aimed at Warner [See Table 
3]. However, the boundary conditions, or policies emphasized in a political brand, mostly 
overlapped between the two candidates but for a few notable exceptions. Warner kept health care 
out of his brand completely [See Table 4], while Gillespie emphasized the issue as a major part 
of his brand [See Table 5]. Conversely, Warner placed Women’s Rights and LGBT issues within 
his brand, yet Gillespie mentioned neither as a part of his own.  
 Furthermore, the difference in what issues each candidate placed higher emphasis on 
reflected the Virginia electorate at the time and the outreach of the campaigns. Mark Warner 
placed low emphasis on energy and the environment and rural Virginia, issues that Ed Gillespie 
gave high priority in his brand. Southwest Virginia has grown more securely Republican, and 
Gillespie narrowed in on this electorate as the portion of the state that he could easily take from 
Warner. With the goal of this portion of the state in mind, Gillespie’s brand emphasized energy 
and environment issues through a discussion of EPA regulations due to the coal mining 
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population in Southwest Virginia. Warner included his work and history on these issues in his 
brand, but he did not give them a high priority, signaling a perceived weakness against Gillespie.  
 Gillespie’s focus on Southwest Virginia coincides with the overall partisan-centered 
focus of his brand. Gillespie emphasized party affiliation over bipartisanship in his brand, while 
Warner never defined himself in partisan terms. Rather, Warner always discussed himself as a 
bipartisan lawmaker, even touting the phrase “radical centrist” to define himself. Gillespie, on 
the other hand, highlighted his work as chairman of the Republican National Committee and in 
the George W. Bush administration, while Warner emphasized his history of bucking 
Democratic leadership and always working with Republican partners on legislation. The 
difference the candidates emphasized in their brand differentiators is then reflected in the 
boundary conditions they chose to attach to their brand. Warner focused on a broad range of 
issues that addressed Virginians throughout the state, and Gillespie placed higher emphasis on 
the more conservative values important to those in areas like Southwest Virginia, such as 
environmental regulations, and less on policies important to the more liberal Northern Virginia 
electorate, such as progressive social issues.  
 It is undeniable that the Republican Party’s national brand contributed to the hyper 
partisan focus of the 2014 midterms across the nation because its cornerstone was presenting a 
clear alternative to Democratic policies. In a broad view, the 2014 elections were seen as intense 
partisan battles due to both the high probability that Republicans would take over the Senate and 
the unpopularity of President Barack Obama at the time. This added set of dramatics intensified 
the partisan nature of the campaigns because Republican candidates across the nation crafted 
their brands as partisan attacks against Democratic policies. As a result, many Democratic 
incumbents attempted to promote a brand of bipartisanship and sought to distance themselves 
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from partisan alliances. These national brands were apparent in the Warner–Gillespie race. 
 The significance of the differences between brand strategies is important because 
candidates use their constructed brands to define and sell themselves to voters and encourage 
base turnout while also attempting to define their opponent in an effort to gain the undecided 
support. The essence of branding is to define something as individualistic. In doing so, a brand 
will always exist as a contrast to the alternative. In marketing, branding is about convincing the 
public to buy one product versus the other because the branded product works better. This, in 
turn, explicitly or implicitly defines the opposing product as lesser. Therefore, branding 
essentially exists as an offensive strategy. This is no less true in political branding; in 
constructing one’s image, a candidate will simultaneously deconstruct their opponent.74 
         Gillespie was in a difficult position compared to other Republican challengers due to 
Warner’s strong bipartisan history. Furthermore, Gillespie was virtually unknown in Virginia, 
and therefore had to build his brand from scratch while competing against a politician with a 
brand built and reinforced through previous statewide campaigns and throughout years of public 
service in elected office. Gillespie’s strategy was to tap into the partisan conflict prevalent in the 
national discussion and attempt to rebrand Warner. By redefining Warner as a politician who 
stood in line with President Obama, Gillespie was able to utilize Obama’s unpopularity and 
inject that into the Virginia campaign, forcing Warner to work harder at selling his brand. 
Despite Warner’s popularity in Virginia, Gillespie used Obama to define Warner, and in turn was 
able to define himself as the alternative to both.  
 However, as stated before, this study focuses on explicit attempts to define an opponent. 
When determining the candidates’ brands, and when coding articles, an attack from Gillespie 
against Warner elicits coding for Gillespie’s brand and Warner’s brand. For instance, Gillespie’s 
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focus on health care was an effort to attach Warner to the Affordable Care Act, something 
Warner sought to keep out of his brand. When Gillespie mentioned Warner’s involvement with 
the health care legislation, “Health Care” is coded as a boundary condition for Warner’s brand – 
a successful instance of Gillespie defining Warner. Furthermore, when Warner highlights 
himself as a bipartisan politician, he is setting himself apart from Gillespie and in turn defining 
his opponent as a partisan candidate. However, only when Warner explicitly calls Gillespie a 
partisan operative is both “Bipartisanship” coded under Warner’s brand differentiators and 
“Partisan” under Gillespie’s brand differentiators. If Warner highlights himself as bipartisan with 
no explicit mention of his opponent, only Warner’s “Bipartisanship” brand differentiator is 
coded.  
 Regardless of the efforts by candidates to define themselves and their opponents through 
messaging, speeches, and campaign events, media remain a main source of information for most 
voters who are not inclined to attend political events or seek out information on campaign 
websites. Therefore, whether or not media reflect the brands created by candidates is significant 
to the success of a campaign. Across the board, media coverage of Virginia’s 2014 U.S. 
senatorial candidates did not fully represent the brands crafted and posited by the individual 
candidates. There was a clear disparity between the candidates’ constructed brands and the 
discussion of the campaign present in media coverage. The majority of brand qualities identified 
in the inductive measurement of each candidate’s brand were not often present in news coverage 
by both the Washington Post and the Richmond Times-Dispatch.  
The disparity in coverage is understandable considering the political history of each 
candidate [See Table 1]. Mark Warner has been a part of Virginia politics for nearly two decades 
and served as a U.S. Senator during the campaign. Therefore, articles mentioning Senator 
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Warner were not always solely focused on the campaign. Media covered Senator Warner’s work 
in the Senate, as well as his role in Virginia issues. Conversely, the 2014 Senatorial campaign 
was Ed Gillespie’s first foray into Virginia politics and his only role at the time of the campaign 
was as a candidate for U.S. Senate. Therefore, nearly every mention of Ed Gillespie in these two 
news outlets was in the context of his race against Senator Warner. As a result, since Senator 
Warner dominated media coverage, he presumably had more opportunity for his brand to be 
present in media coverage.  
There were only three instances in which a quality of a political brand was represented in 
the majority of news articles coded. For Senator Mark Warner, the brand differentiator of 
“Political Experience” was present in 66.67 percent of Washington Post articles, and the brand 
differentiator of “Partisan” was present in 56.67 percent of articles discussing Warner. For Ed 
Gillespie, the brand differentiator of “Partisan” was present in 69.23 percent of Richmond Time-
Dispatch articles. All other brand differentiators were not present in the majority of articles 
coded, and no boundary conditions were present in the majority of articles [See Table 6].  
 However, the lack of brand qualities present in a majority of articles is an expected result 
because not every article is focused on the campaign or even the candidate. For instance, some 
articles that mentioned Senator Mark Warner were unrelated to the senatorial campaign or even 
his political career.75  
 It is almost impossible for news coverage to mirror candidate brands, as political brands 
encompass a large number of policy issues, while articles usually have a singular focus on a 
specific event or policy. The only instances in which media typically highlight a large quantity of 
boundary conditions from a candidate’s brand is in a candidate profile or the first reporting of a 
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stump speech. Those cases did not arise here because the articles coded were from the final 
month of the campaign, in which campaign reporters are presumably tired of focusing on the 
same message points and rhetoric candidates have delivered since they first hit the trail. In the 
articles coded, the stories that presented the most boundary conditions in a single report were 
coverage of debates, which are one of few instances in which media consider a variety of issues 
to be newsworthy at a singular event. Even the candidates themselves do not emphasize every 
policy of their brand at every campaign stop. Candidates often tailor their message to the specific 
constituency they are addressing, and therefore it is unlikely that media across the board would 
reflect in a major way the specific policies that exist as part of a candidate’s brand.  
 In theory, the strategies behind political branding and news reporting are exact opposites. 
Political brands are carefully crafted to represent comprehensively the qualities of political 
experience and ability, policy knowledge, and value stances of a candidate. These brands are 
promoted continuously and in a uniform manner throughout the duration of the campaign in an 
effort to inform and inspire voters. Conversely, news reporting is meant to sell. Profit 
motivations force the media to churn out exciting and compelling news to the public, and the 
public seeks drama, entertainment, and confirmation of prior beliefs through their news 
consumption. While candidates continue to push their respective brands, coverage narrows in on 
the qualities of opposition and discordance between candidates and within brands.  
         Media coverage for the 2014 midterms was not atypical for a media that is usually 
focused on game frame coverage of politics. Partisan game framing of political news as a 
struggle between parties is prominent because this type of coverage sells. This coverage is 
emphasized in campaign reporting because campaigns tend to be a constant narrative of one 
candidate making gains on the other for a day and then falling behind the next. Horse race 
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coverage is gripping and makes for exciting and changing news throughout the months that 
campaigns last.   
 However, within this national narrative of 2014, the Virginia senatorial campaign 
provides a unique perspective because while both candidates closely mirrored the national 
strategy of their parties, media coverage varied in Virginia as compared to other races because 
Senator Warner was expected to defeat Ed Gillespie overwhelmingly. Virginia media could not 
follow the typical horse race coverage of campaigns because every poll placed Warner with a 
large lead over Gillespie. Additionally, Warner’s bipartisan brand was unique in that it was not 
new in 2014. For years, as a Virginia governor and as a U.S. Senator, Warner produced and 
promoted a bipartisan brand through his efforts and successes in working across the aisle to 
achieve solutions. Therefore, while many media described embattled Democratic candidates in 
2014 as running from their party, media covering the Virginia race described Warner within the 
context of his continued bipartisan brand. As a result, Gillespie crafted an explicitly partisan 
attack-based campaign, while Warner sought to defend his record and protect his brand rather 
than spend his time messaging against his opponent. The clear difference in strategy between the 
two candidates is that Ed Gillespie sought to define himself through redefining his opponent 
explicitly, while Senator Warner sought to define his opponent implicitly through reaffirming his 
own brand.  
 A disparity in coverage between the two candidates in Virginia’s senatorial race further 
shows how redefinition of an opponent’s recognized brand is more difficult than defending a 
brand established over time. The higher amount of coverage for Senator Warner [See Table 1] 
explains why the most prominent aspect of Warner’s brand conveyed in media coverage was 
“Political Experience” [See Table 6]. If an article did not mention Warner in relation to the 
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campaign, it was still likely to mention his work in the Senate or the fact that he served as 
Governor of Virginia, both instances that indicate experience in politics. However, the reverse 
effect of this assumed advantage is that an incumbent has a political history more susceptible to 
criticism. Gillespie capitalized on this, focusing his brand as an attack on Senator Warner’s 
history, including past votes, statements, and actions while in office. While most brands are used 
simultaneously to define a candidate and the opponent, Gillespie’s brand is an attempt to define 
himself through redefining Warner. “Opponent Failure” is a major portion of Gillespie brand 
differentiators, revealing he attempted to craft his brand as a contrast to Warner’s alleged failures 
[See Table 3]. It is strategic for a challenger to craft their brand as an attack on an incumbent’s 
history because the opponent can identify the problems constituents feel are most prevalent, 
attach those problems to the incumbent’s history, and then promote one’s own brand as the 
solution.  
         Gillespie succeeded in this strategy, and media coverage reflected Ed Gillespie’s 
definition of Senator Warner more so than Warner’s own branding of himself. Reporters 
emphasized the partisan qualities of Warner that Gillespie highlighted because it was such an 
unexpected divergence from Warner’s history. Due to the fact that this race was not close, 
journalists were inclined to emphasize any possible instance that might make the race more 
exciting and similar to the national narrative of the 2014 midterms.  
The Affordable Care Act provides the clearest example of Gillespie’s strategy 
manifesting in media coverage. Gillespie tapped into the frustration felt by constituents regarding 
this legislation, defined Warner’s time in office as a reason for the law’s passing, and in turn 
defined himself as the candidate who would act as the antithesis to Warner on this issue. This is a 
clear example of how brand differentiators and boundary conditions overlap to construct a brand. 
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By highlighting a specific boundary condition – in this case “Health Care” – Gillespie criticized 
his opponent’s attachment to a certain issue and thus differentiated his brand from Warner’s.  
 The fact that brand qualities are largely unrepresented in the coded articles, however, 
does not mean that the political brands of either candidate were not successful. Rather, major 
qualities of both brands were present in media coverage, but media descriptions of the candidates 
never manifested as exact replicas of the promoted brands. It is unlikely that brands would be 
represented fully in campaign coverage because the brands crafted by the candidates are 
comprehensive looks at their political beliefs, ideology, and goals as an elected official. A 
political brand contains a large number of characteristics and qualities, and therefore it would be 
both impossible and impractical for media coverage to pick up and convey a full brand in a 
single article. Rather, looking at the number of times certain brand qualities appeared in media 
coverage as compared to other qualities reveals interesting results in terms of what aspects of the 
political brands were represented in media for each candidate.  
 When analyzing the presence of certain brand differentiators over others, the candidates 
were fairly successful in seeing significant characteristics of their brands represented in media 
coverage. As mentioned earlier, Senator Warner was often written of as an experienced public 
servant, an aspect that he personally emphasized. Additionally, coverage across the board 
displayed Warner as a bipartisan representative more often than Ed Gillespie. “Bipartisanship” is 
the most prominent aspect of Senator Warner’s brand [See Table 2] and is a quality that his 
brand connects from his time as Governor to the present. The emphasis on this was successful, as 
coverage of Senator Warner defined him as bipartisan in 41.18 percent of Richmond Times-
Dispatch articles and 40 percent of Washington Post articles, whereas only 23.08 percent of 
Richmond Times-Dispatch articles and 22.22 percent of Washington Post articles described Ed 
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Gillespie as having bipartisan qualities [See Table 6].  
 Similarly, Gillespie is displayed in a heavily partisan light because that is emphasized 
highly in his brand [See Table 3]. He brands himself as a clear alternative to Senator Warner and 
President Obama, and he highlights his experience serving as chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, both clear indications of partisan loyalty. Gillespie emphasized partisanship 
because of the political climate that existed during the 2014 midterm elections. Presidential 
approval numbers were low, yet Senator Warner’s approval numbers in Virginia were high, so it 
made sense for Gillespie to construct his brand as the polar opposite to Democratic policies, most 
notably the Affordable Care Act.  
 The results of Gillespie’s partisan branding strategy assisted him in reconstructing 
Senator Warner’s brand. Despite Warner’s reiteration of a bipartisan record and the media’s 
fairly consistent display of that quality, the number of news articles that described Warner as 
“Partisan” were surprisingly high: 35.29 percent of Richmond Times-Dispatch articles and 56.67 
percent of Washington Post articles cast Warner as partisan. The Washington Post even wrote of 
Warner in partisan terms more often than they did of Gillespie, as well as more than they 
described Warner in bipartisan terms [See Table 6].  
 A few factors caused these results. Both strategic political branding by Gillespie and 
outside circumstances contributed to the high percentage of articles casting Warner in a partisan 
light. First, Gillespie’s brand from the start of his campaign was centered on the idea of Gillespie 
being a departure from Obama–Warner policies. In his campaign platform, Gillespie states, “My 
five-point agenda for growth would be the polar opposite of the failed philosophy of diminished 
expectations we have endured for the last five years with Mark Warner and President Obama.”76 
He goes on to use phrases such as, “At every turn, President Obama and his Democratic allies in 
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Congress like Mark Warner,” “the Warner–Obama solution,” and “promises President Obama 
and Mark Warner made.” Ed Gillespie essentially made his campaign a proxy race against 
President Obama, with Mark Warner standing as a representative of the President’s policies. 
While this was a contrast to the brand that Senator Warner pushed, it was more accessible to both 
those disgruntled with the Obama’s administration and a media reliant on game frame, 
adversarial coverage. Additionally, the national story of the 2014 midterms was one of a 
Republican surge against Obama policies, so it was easier for Gillespie’s story to resonate with 
and be projected in the media’s agenda.  
 However, beyond consistent rhetoric tying Warner to Obama, Gillespie also employed a 
powerful tool to catch the media and the public’s attention: the sound bite. Gillespie put forth a 
statistic that Senator Warner had voted with President Obama 97 percent of the time during the 
past six years. Though the statistic was labeled as misleading and not accurate of Warner’s truly 
bipartisan record, the phrase stuck and was mentioned, discussed, and analyzed in a large 
number of articles. Gillespie stuck to this sound bite throughout the campaign, and it became 
both a top point of his stump speech, a recurring message in his commercials, and one of the 
easiest phrases for journalists to employ in describing the nature of the race.  
 The other reason a large percentage of articles were coded as representing Warner in a 
partisan light is due to the emergence of a story in early October that tied Warner to a move by 
Democratic elected officials in Virginia to dissuade state Senator Phil Puckett from retiring and 
thereby shifting the Democratic majority in the state Senate over to Republicans. The story was 
often mentioned in conjunction with campaign coverage for the remainder of the race, and Ed 
Gillespie seized the opportunity to further highlight his opponent as a partisan politician.  
 Again, a notable aspect of Gillespie’s partisan-based brand in this context is that even 
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while attempting to redefine Warner as a partisan politician, he never sought to explicitly present 
himself as the contrast to partisan politics. Gillespie did not promote in his brand that he would 
provide a bipartisan voice in the Senate, and media coverage did not draw the conclusion that 
Gillespie casting Warner as bipartisan was an attempt to say he, as an alternative, would be 
bipartisan. In fact, media coverage described Gillespie as a partisan at a rate of more than 50 
percent of the time that they described him as bipartisan [See Table 6]. While branding is often a 
strategy of showing a black-and-white contrast, Gillespie’s branding strategy on this issue was a 
two-step process. In defining Warner as partisan, Gillespie attached him to Democratic policies 
and could then sell voters on his own Republican policies as being the stronger alternative. 
Neither voters nor media would have easily bought into a Republican challenger being a clear 
alternative to Warner unless Warner was recast as being further to the left than his brand 
claimed.  
 Even while faced with these factors, though, Senator Warner’s bipartisan brand was not 
badly diminished despite the increase of partisan-focused coverage [See Table 6]. The final 
article coded for the Washington Post, published four days before Election Day still noted, 
“Warner’s past as a popular governor and willingness to buck his party…will likely help him 
avoid the fate many of his colleagues face.”77 The final article coded from the Richmond Times-
Dispatch, published three days before Election Day, discussed Warner’s “record as a bipartisan 
deal maker.”78  
 The strength of Warner’s bipartisan brand despite numerous factors pushing against and 
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attempting to redefine it confirms many of the ideas posited by political brand theory. First, 
Warner’s brand was harder to break because it existed for years and was reiterated by legitimate 
actions and achievements as both Governor and Senator. It is harder for a challenger to redefine 
an incumbent opponent’s brand because the incumbent has essentially built their brand since his 
or her first campaign and reinforced it in the minds of constituents during time in office. 
Secondly, Warner’s extensive history in Virginia gave him a name recognition that was 
unrivaled by Ed Gillespie, a newcomer when it came to public candidacy. This case reveals that 
it is harder for a candidate to define an opponent when they face a barrier to defining their own 
brand first.  
 Despite the way media constantly reiterated the attacks presented by Gillespie, Warner’s 
brand remained strong due to its verifiable history. More often than not, media would present 
Gillespie’s challenge to Warner’s bipartisanship with a supplemental description of Warner’s 
bipartisan successes or by explicitly pointing out that Gillespie was attempting to negate the 
incumbent’s record. This move by the media to seemingly defend Warner’s record is reflective 
of the power of a well-crafted and implemented brand. While Gillespie’s claims were factual 
(Warner did vote for the Affordable Care Act, and the 97 percent figure, though misleading, was, 
in fact, accurate), challenging a brand built and reinforced over a number of years is nearly 
impossible. While other Democrats in the 2014 midterms tried to almost re-brand themselves, 
Warner was defending the brand he held from the start of his political career, making Gillespie’s 
redefinition more scrutinized in media than other Republican challengers in the country.  
 Furthermore, it was difficult for Gillespie to define Warner because most voters did not 
even know Gillespie, who had for years been a national political figure behind the scenes but had 
never before run for office. Gillespie tried to navigate this obstacle by defining himself as the 
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direct contrast to Warner and Obama, but this counter-definition was still weak against Warner’s 
fortified brand. Conversely, it was easier for Warner to define Gillespie as his polar opposite – a 
“partisan warrior”79 – because voters possessed an understanding of Warner as a bipartisan 
politician and could thus easily interpret his antithesis as a partisan politician.  
 However, Ed Gillespie was more successful at bringing major aspects of his brand into 
the center of the campaign conversation by crafting portions of his brand around the national 
conversation. Gillespie tapped into topics that ruled the national debate during the 2014 
midterms, such as the Affordable Care Act and environmental issues like the Keystone pipeline, 
while also centering much of his brand on constantly accessible topics such as the economy and 
jobs [See Table 5]. These issues resonated with voters and media because they were prevalent 
topics being discussed throughout the nation.  
 The most obvious example of Gillespie’s success in this regard was his focus on the 
Affordable Care Act. The policy was widely unpopular amongst Republicans and thus many 
Democratic incumbents in purple states, such as Virginia, tried to avoid the ACA as a topic of 
debate in the midterms. Gillespie tapped into the discontent and used the ACA as his main line of 
attack in attaching Mark Warner to President Obama and the policies that angered Republican 
and some independent voters. The resulting data shows that health care was a larger defining 
quality in coverage of Mark Warner than in coverage of Ed Gillespie [See Table 7]. In the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 35.29 percent of Mark Warner coverage included health care versus 
only 26.92 percent of Ed Gillespie. An even more dramatic contrast exists in the Washington 
Post’s coverage, with 30 percent of Mark Warner articles focusing on health care, while only 
7.41 percent of articles attached Ed Gillespie to health care policy. The disparity stems from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Mark Warner, “Virginia Senate candidates: Mark Warner,” Richmond Time-Dispatch, (November 1, 
2014). 
43	  
	  
fact that health care was used in Gillespie’s brand to define Warner rather than himself. Gillespie 
did not present his own ideas for an alternative on health care until October 10, and even then, 
media coverage focused on Warner’s ACA vote rather than Gillespie’s proposed changes, a fact 
reflective of the media’s tendency to focus on conflict over policy specifics. Warner obviously 
wanted to avoid the subject, as “Health Care” made up zero percent of his brand [See Table 4], 
yet Gillespie utilized the media and the public’s obsession and attachment to this issue to 
promote this agenda and weaken the incumbent.  
 Nonetheless, Gillespie’s success here does more to confirm that media are influenced by 
profit than by disseminating specific policy information or the candidates’ constructed brands. 
Reporters are motivated to produce coverage that will draw in readers and sell news. The result 
is game frame coverage and a focus on issues of competition, criticism, and conflict. The ACA 
was a perfect issue for that type of coverage, and it was further enticing to reporters because it 
was a national topic of debate and a topic that was easily accessible by the public and 
controversial enough to draw in readers. Furthermore, Gillespie’s use of the ACA in his branding 
was in a critical attack against Warner. Reporters ran with this frame and used it to set the 
dialogue of the race as a clash between the candidates.  
Overall, major policy cornerstones of each campaign were represented in media coverage 
in small numbers, and amongst all the issues that made up the candidates’ boundary conditions, 
only a select few existed in large percentages media coverage [See Table 7]. Gillespie’s 
campaign was centered around his “agenda for economic growth,” and 34.62 percent of articles 
in the Richmond Times-Dispatch and 33.33 percent of Washington Post articles emphasized the 
economy in coverage of Ed Gillespie. Mark Warner had greater success seeing major aspects of 
his brand emphasized in the Richmond Times-Dispatch than in the Washington Post. Working to 
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fix the budget was a high priority for Warner in the Senate, and that history is reflected and 
emphasized in his brand [See Table 4]. The Richmond Times-Dispatch discussed Warner in 
relation to budget issues 20.59 percent of the time, but the Washington Post only did so 6.67 
percent of the time. Additionally, the media did not cover Warner in conjunction with a focus on 
the economy in the same way they did for Gillespie, even though Warner also emphasized the 
issue in his own brand. The Richmond Times-Dispatch wrote of Warner and the economy 17.65 
percent of the time, and the Washington Post reported on Warner and the economy 6.67 percent 
of the time [See Table 7].  
 Reporters failed to cover comprehensively all other boundary conditions for either 
candidate as well. The prevalence of economic issues in media coverage is reflective of the fact 
that the economy is constantly a major issue in the public’s mind and the media’s agenda. 
Disenchantment with the state of the economy is an issue that is always prevalent, yet given the 
fact that Gillespie’s brand was presented as “Ed Gillespie’s Agenda for Economic Growth,” the 
fact that media only covered economic issues in less than 35 percent of articles across the board 
shows that they are not receptive to covering the boundary conditions promoted by candidates in 
their brands.  
 Amongst all the attempts to brand and rebrand one another, both candidates failed in 
getting their policy focuses promoted in media coverage. The nuts and bolts of policy are largely 
ignored by media, and instead, the debate and opposition surrounding certain issues and values is 
what media displayed. This approach is what caused health care to be picked up as a major issue 
both nationally and in Virginia coverage of the 2014 midterms. The Affordable Care Act 
provided the clearest partisan divide when it came to policy, and media covered health care in 
the context of partisan disagreement rather than presenting and critically analyzing facts and 
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ideas of health care policy. Media coverage reflected Ed Gillespie’s attempt to prioritize health 
care in the campaign conversation, yet it rarely focused on proposals of reform from either 
candidate. Media coverage failed even to couple the issue of health care alongside descriptions 
of Gillespie’s candidacy, despite the fact that he dedicated a major portion of his brand to this 
issue [See Table 5]. In all of Gillespie’s campaign text, he argued for repeal and reform of the 
Affordable Care Act, yet this was rarely mentioned in media coverage. Rather, Gillespie’s 
portrayal of Warner’s attachment to the health care policy was the most prevalent issue at hand 
in coverage, resulting in media continually describing Warner’s relation to health care policy and 
almost completely ignoring the issue in relation to Gillespie.  
 The media’s agenda setting priority often outweighs any compulsion to discuss the topics 
put forth and emphasized by candidates. In the case of health care, a lucky intersection for Ed 
Gillespie occurred between a candidate’s agenda and the media’s agenda. However, there were 
few other instances where that happened. During October, Ebola arose as a major topic of 
discussion in the United States, and Ebola response became a main topic in many senatorial 
races. The result in Virginia media was national security becoming one of the most discussed 
boundary conditions in news coverage80 [See Table 7] even though neither candidate gave that 
policy high priority in their espoused brands [See Table 4 and Table 5]. This supports the idea 
that the policies a candidate pushes as the main tenants of their brand are only likely to be picked 
up heavily in media coverage if those topics match the media’s agenda. The media’s agenda 
reflects the national discussion because media want to sell news and therefore cover issues the 
public is focused on. In turn, media assist in driving the national conversation by focusing on 
certain issues over others. In this instance, the public feared Ebola, which media tapped into and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 80 Ebola stories were coded as a national security issue because the story was discussed as a threat to public 
health and national security, with many political officials urging a close of travel to the U.S. from infected countries.  
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exacerbated the issue through their dramatized coverage and connection of the issue to the 
campaign.   
 The most prevalent aspect of media coverage, especially during campaigns, is game 
frame coverage. The data acquired from coding shows that media were more likely to pick up 
and emphasize aspects of candidate brands that involved criticism or attacks of the opponent. 
From the start of Gillespie’s campaign, criticism of his opponent was a major part of his brand 
[See Table 3]. Opponent criticism made up 20 percent of Gillespie’s overall brand differentiators 
whereas the same quality made up only 7 percent of Mark Warner’s brand [See Table 2]. Both 
texts used to measure Gillespie’s brand contained criticism of his opponent, indicating a high 
priority on this quality. As the challenger, Gillespie sought from the start of his campaign to cast 
himself as a contrast to his opponent, which required immediate and continuous criticisms.  
 However, Mark Warner’s first text contained no criticism of his opponent or even the 
opposing party. His second text, published later in the campaign, actually criticized Gillespie, yet 
Warner’s criticism is notable because it is focused more as a criticism of partisanship than of 
Gillespie. Gillespie differentiated his brand from Warner’s by immediately and repeatedly 
criticizing Warner’s policy stances and political actions, including his vote for the ACA and lack 
of support for a balanced budget amendment. Warner, however, crafted his brand as an emphasis 
of his bipartisan record and focused criticism on Gillespie as “a partisan political operative,” 
saying, “He sees every issue through the lens of Republican-versus-Democrat. He even calls 
himself a ‘partisan warrior.’”81 
 This contrast is significant because the criticism present in Warner’s brand thus stands 
out as an attack on partisanship more so than an attack against Gillespie or the Republican Party. 
This is understandable because it complements the bipartisan legislator brand, yet it also affected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 81 Mark Warner, “Virginia Senate candidates: Mark Warner,” Richmond Times-Dispatch.  
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the way media covered Warner in the campaign. The media ignored this nuance, and the 
inclination toward game framing resulted in extreme scrutiny once Warner finally went negative 
and released attack ads against Gillespie. The media jumped on this development, emphasizing 
the conflict in the story and delving into the validity of the attacks. Warner’s ads incited a media 
firestorm around his claims, likely because they were a fresh development to the rather stagnant 
and uncompetitive race. Gillespie engaged in the same attacks throughout his time on the 
campaign trail, and polls continued to show Warner in the lead by a huge margin, so reporters 
were excited to see a development that they could play up in order to make the race appear more 
thrilling. Coverage of Warner’s attack ads focused on two major aspects: that they were a 
departure from Warner’s previous rhetoric and signaled a tightening race. Additionally, the 
strategy of many Democratic candidates to distance themselves from partisan rhetoric backfired 
because rather than cover these candidates as bipartisan politicians, media narrowed in on the 
intra-party conflict, focusing on how Democrats tried to distance themselves from unpopular 
policies. The result was an increased scrutiny of the strategy employed by many Democrats. 
 The evidence is ample in this study that the media’s focus during campaign season is on 
horse race coverage rather than policy, issues, or candidate brands. Even though horse race 
coverage was not prevalent in this analysis given the lack of new polling in the final few weeks 
of the campaign, the news coverage analyzed still revealed that brands fail to be picked up in 
media coverage because they do not offer developing information. Rather, brands are strictly 
crafted and adhered to throughout the campaign. This is evident by analyzing the two example 
texts of each candidate’s brand. Though they were written at the beginning and end of the 
campaign, respectively, there were few changes in the brands. While media will continually 
mention brief identifiers posited in a brand, such as party affiliation and political experience, 
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they are unlikely to mention the major policy proposals candidates consistently push throughout 
the campaign. Especially for reporters who follow the candidates for the length of the campaign, 
it is impractical to publish stories continually on the candidates’ stump speeches, so reporters 
narrow in on any potential development or change to the fairly repetitive rhetoric present during 
campaigns.  
 This type of focus often manifests in a large amount of polling coverage by the media, 
but again, polling in the Virginia senatorial race did not offer many new developments for media 
to focus coverage on. Senator Warner maintained a huge lead over Ed Gillespie throughout the 
campaign, and the most interesting development media were able to pull from new polls was that 
Gillespie “gained ground,” though polls still showed Warner with “a double-digit lead.”82 
However, the media’s inclination toward horse race coverage is evident in the large amount of 
process stories published during this campaign. Many stories focused on funds raised by the two 
candidates, ad buys, and debates, whereas campaign events throughout the state were 
overwhelmingly ignored.  
 Furthermore, while aspects of brands promoted by candidates do appear in media 
coverage, it is clear that media pick the characteristics of political brands that fit their agenda and 
inclination toward dramatic and combative coverage. The policy areas focused on heavily in this 
race were those that incited harsh sparring between the two candidates, such as the debate over 
health care policy. Additionally, media emphasized the brand differentiators of criticizing and 
attempting to define the opponent because of the antagonistic nature of those brands. For 
example, when it came to brand differentiators, reporters were more likely to pick up on 
Gillespie’s attacks on Warner’s bipartisan record, which resulted in the media portraying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 82 Jim Nolan, “Senate poll: Warner up 51-39,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, (October 8, 2014), 
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Warner’s reality as contrary to his own brand while simultaneously describing Gillespie as the 
alternative.  
 This coverage is significant in this race because of Ed Gillespie’s brand played into this 
type of coverage, while Senator Warner’s brand attempted to break from the partisan-focused, 
game frame coverage that is present in most news. By crafting a brand centered around attacks 
on his opponent, Gillespie was more successful at having his message easily received and 
disseminated by the media, while Warner was less able to see his centrist brand reflected in a 
media environment hungry for dramatic stories. Additionally, this resulted in greater scrutiny 
when Warner’s brand broke from its established norms. Gillespie’s method of defining himself 
through re-defining Warner was a unique strategy that is difficult to execute due to the name 
recognition advantage of incumbents. However, Gillespie’s success stems from attempting to 
define Warner through frames that the media were more likely to pick up. 
 Attaching Warner to the Affordable Care Act and President Obama was the type of game 
frame attack that media jumped on and were thrilled to write about for two major reasons: one, it 
was based in conflict between the two candidates, and two, it defined Warner as completely 
antithetical to his own brand. This may have been more dramatic in this race than in others 
because of Warner’s long and successful history as a Virginia politician and bipartisan 
lawmaker, but Gillespie’s ability to come in and make cracks in Warner’s brand successfully 
affected media coverage because it showed a dramatic break from the norm of Warner that most 
of Virginia knew.     
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Political branding remains a concept that is difficult to define and critically analyze 
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because the strategy itself continues to develop over the course of a campaign alongside the 
constant changes in political dynamics, media behavior, and public opinion. Candidate branding 
cannot be understood as a single formula that can be implemented in a right or wrong way. The 
context in which a campaign exists is detrimental to whether or not a political brand will 
succeed. Public sentiment changes over time and across constituencies, affecting how receptive 
an electorate will be toward a certain brand. Understanding the effectiveness of one political 
brand against another only reveals so much about political branding because a brand that works 
in one election could fail completely in another.   
 What this study sought to identify was not whether political branding works in securing 
votes or driving voter turnout. It is undeniable that messaging of a candidate’s brand is an 
effective and imperative factor amongst many in winning a campaign, but the question posed by 
this study is how well the implementation of brand messaging in media relations strategies works 
in regards to directly relaying a candidate’s brand to constituents. It should be understood, of 
course, that media coverage is only one way in which candidates disseminate their brand. 
However, considering most voters acquire their political knowledge through the media, this 
study aimed to determine whether media are likely to reflect the political brands crafted and 
disseminated by candidates throughout a campaign. With media acting as the main channel of 
information from candidate to voter, if a political brand is lost in that process then it begs the 
question of how useful the technique of pushing brands through media is to a campaign. The 
main conclusion pulled from this study is that the media will not serve as a conduit for the 
promotion of a single candidate’s brand, but brands do have a strong effect on how a campaign is 
covered and partially contribute to what image of the candidate and the campaign voters receive 
through media coverage.  
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 The success or failure regarding the potential of a candidate’s political brand to be 
reflected in media’s campaign coverage is dependent upon whether or not that brand is 
conducive to the media’s behaviors, biases, and agenda. Candidates that promote combative, 
partisan-focused brands will see more traces of their narrative in media coverage than candidates 
that prioritize policy, compromise, or experience. This is evident in the coding of news coverage 
of the Warner–Gillespie race. It is unclear whether the media’s tendency to game frame coverage 
leads to more partisan-focused political branding or whether increasingly negative campaigns 
leads to a rise in combative media narratives. However, what is evident in literature and as a 
conclusive thought from this study is that the media’s game frame coverage and the rise of 
partisan polarization in both the political and public arena all influence one another and generate 
a cyclical relationship of increasingly partisan campaign politics. 
 Political brands more likely to be reflected in media coverage and more likely to drive 
voter turnout are brands based in challenge and change. This was apparent in the 2008 
presidential election, when the media promoted President Barack Obama’s message of change, 
and voters turned out in large numbers of support because of their anger with the status quo and 
desire for something completely new. As a result, brands of change are by nature based in 
partisanship. A change in the political environment almost always means a change in party.  
         The Republican Party had a powerful advantage in the 2014 midterm elections because 
they were in a position of challenging the status quo, while Democrats had to defend the current 
status of the country that disheartened a large number of Americans. The Democratic defense 
failed to inspire voter turnout by their party’s base because the brand they promoted, and the one 
that was reflected in the media, was that of retreating from the issues on which they were elected 
initially. Conversely, the Republican Party’s brand inspired their voters to turn out in large 
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numbers because the national party tapped into frustration felt by both their stringent supporters 
and undecided voters. Media coverage on the national level reflected this narrative, continually 
highlighting the inevitability of a Republican takeover of Congress and how that would damage 
the status of the Democratic Party and the Obama administration. Horse race coverage existed in 
some local races, but the national story was not close at all. It was expected that Republicans 
would take control of the Senate, and the debate became more about what that meant rather than 
if it would happen.  
 Media coverage of Virginia’s 2014 senatorial campaign followed similar trends of 
national coverage in framing the campaign between Senator Mark Warner and challenger Ed 
Gillespie in the same manner as many of the other high profile midterm races in the United 
States. The conclusions in this study further confirm the idea that local media follow national 
media trends in their coverage. Despite the nature of this race – in that Senator Warner 
maintained a substantial lead over Gillespie in the polls for the entirety of the campaign – media 
coverage framed the race within the same context of other closer, more contested midterm 
elections. In most midterm races, media focused on the Democratic candidates’ ties to President 
Obama and the Affordable Care Act, and they highlighted the race as a partisan battle in which 
the Republicans were on pace to take the Senate. Similarly, Virginia media played up Gillespie’s 
attempts to tie Warner to Obama and the ACA. 
Media content analysis of Virginia’s 2014 senatorial race revealed that media coverage 
will more heavily reflect the qualities of political brands that match up with their agenda to sell 
dramatic, exciting, and fresh news on a daily basis. This study is able to draw the conclusion that 
the very nature of campaigns emphasizes the type of game frame focus on politics that media 
publish. However, this case study in particular shows that media’s agenda is a strong factor in 
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pushing for this frame and injecting it into campaigns. This campaign provided very little 
opportunity for horse race coverage, so media focused on process stories to simulate and 
speculate candidates’ standings in the place of polling. This led to an increased focus on 
instances where Senator Warner broke from his established brand and attacked his opponent. For 
the Virginia media, these breaks were a proxy for polling: they symbolized Gillespie’s success at 
redefining Warner and were described as a sign that the race was becoming closer.  
 Another conclusive aspect of this study is that political branding, like most campaign 
strategies, is susceptible to being compromised by an unexpected development. This is evident in 
the Warner/Gillespie race: the Puckett scandal was unforeseen by either candidate, and it 
arguably did more to deconstruct Warner’s brand than all of Gillespie’s communicative 
strategies during the campaign. Media jump on these unexpected changes due to the dramatic, 
developing nature and because it often sets candidates to zero, and both must figure out how to 
act moving forward.  
Additionally, regardless of how well a political brand fits into the mold of news coverage, 
media will go rogue and attempt to identify and scrutinize political strategies. While coverage 
more often reflected Gillespie’s branding, media were never hesitant to explicitly acknowledge 
the strategy. The dramatic statistics that Gillespie promoted (Warner voting with President 
Obama 97 percent of the time and his vote for the Affordable Care Act) were present in copious 
media reports, but articles typically acknowledged how Gillespie was trying to redefine Warner. 
Furthermore, unique to traditional qualities of modern media, Virginia media actually sought 
outside voices from Virginia politics experts in many articles. This usually consisted of an 
unbiased assessment of the race, and typically described Gillespie’s strategy as an attempt to 
redefine his opponent in a state where he maintained very little name recognition. 
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It is impossible to determine precisely why the results of this race turned out much closer 
than ever expected, but analyzing the realities of each candidate’s brand, the sentiment of the 
country in 2014, and the structure of the Virginia electorate provide useful insight as to why 
Senator Mark Warner’s lead diminished so greatly on November 4, 2014. The polarization of the 
country drove voter turnout in 2014 and caused Republicans to see huge waves of support while 
Democrats faced major losses. In Virginia, a state with an uncertain electorate, galvanizing core 
supporters is necessary to winning any statewide election. While Warner’ bipartisan brand 
worked in past elections, a brand that emphasized breaking from his own party (coupled with the 
presumably unstoppable lead Warner held in every poll) may have failed to inspire the large 
liberal base of Northern Virginia to go out and secure Warner’s victory.  
 Ultimately, this study should not be viewed as a definitive conclusion on the success of 
political brands in modern campaigns or a final say on how media coverage affects campaign 
results or voter interpretation of candidates. It is important to note that while the results of this 
particular case study reveal broad trends in the discussion of candidate branding and campaign 
coverage, the conclusions posited in this paper must be understood as purely speculative due to 
the fact that only a single race was analyzed in depth. As previously noted, the strategies and 
effects of political branding vary depending on candidate, electorate, time, media agenda, and a 
number of other factors that contribute to the ever-changing nature of politics and political 
behavior.  
 This study draws conclusions about political branding and media coverage of the 
candidate brands in Virginia’s 2014 U.S. senatorial race between Senator Mark Warner and Ed 
Gillespie. It is impossible to say the same conclusions would be present in the study of another 
2014 midterm race, or a race between Mark Warner and different candidate, or even a race 
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between the same candidates in a different state or different year. However, what the results of 
this study can assert are general conclusions about the relationship between candidate brands and 
media coverage of those brands in political campaigns:  
- Media remain focused on game frame coverage, and candidate brands that emphasize 
opponent criticism will see that narrative played out in news coverage.  
 
- Brands are built over time, and media are receptive to brands that are reinforced over 
years. Conversely, when there emerges a break from a politician’s established brand, 
media will emphasize that break in coverage. 
 
- Media will ignore the nuts and bolts of policy, choosing rather to focus on the contention 
between candidates on certain issues without delving deeply into the divergence of ideas 
or specifics of reform.  
 
These conclusions can be applied generally in theorizing how media will cover campaigns, but 
these are not definitive results that would necessarily be echoed in other campaign analyses 
looking at the same ideas. The race between Senator Mark Warner and Ed Gillespie provides a 
unique look at how political branding exists in a race where an incumbent sought to defend their 
established brand, and an unknown challenger sought to define himself by redefining a well-
known politician.  
Political branding is an imperative aspect to a successful campaign, and the media are not 
the sole channel through which candidates can promote and disseminate the qualities of their 
brand that set them apart from their opponent. However, in utilizing media coverage to their 
greatest advantage, candidates will find brand messaging focused on criticizing their opponent 
and drawing partisan-based contrasts are more likely to be conveyed in news coverage. Media’s 
tendency toward game frame coverage undoubtedly drives a greater implementation of partisan 
attacks by candidates. 
This study hopes to serve as a piece in the ever-developing discussion of political brands, 
campaign strategies, media behaviors, and the intersection of these concepts. It is the goal of this 
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study that the conclusions posited here can assist in future studies that seek to identify more 
information about the strategy of creating and successfully implementing a political brand in a 
campaign. The results of this study in particular beg for further research into not only what 
aspects of a candidate’s brand are portrayed in media coverage, but also what aspects of a 
candidate’s brand are actually engrained in constituents’ minds by the end of a campaign. A 
compelling study could focus on whether media actually serve as a channel of information in 
campaigns or whether voters are likely to receive knowledge of a candidate’s brand firsthand. 
Given the specificity of a brand to a certain constituency, and the numerous avenues of outreach 
efforts employed by communication teams, it is possible that the media’s game frame coverage 
does not serve as the main source of information for many citizens, especially those in specific 
communities with stringent issue loyalties that candidates seek to access by utilizing distinct cues 
in their brands.  
 Political branding will remain an integral aspect of campaigning that will vary depending 
on the political environment at the time and the constituency a candidate is campaigning for. As 
the economic restraints on media continue to affect the framing of coverage, campaigns will 
continue to be portrayed through a game frame lens. Candidates that seek to capitalize on this 
will construct their campaign brand around critical attacks on their opponent, but no candidate 
will be able to tailor the issues of a campaign apart from the media’s agenda. A campaign’s 
strategy for promoting a candidate’s brand through media can play a significant role in driving 
voter turnout, as the image of a candidate and the nature of a race portrayed through the news 
remains undoubtedly a major factor in affecting how voters comprehend and interpret 
campaigns.   
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Table 1: News Coverage of 2014 Virginia Senatorial Candidates 
      Mark Warner   Ed Gillespie 
 
            News Outlet                    Total          Number     Percent         Number      Percent      
         
Richmond Times-Dispatch             34                      34                        100  26                 76.5          
 
Washington Post              34                      30                        88.24                27                79.41    
 
 
Note: The above chart represents the coverage of each candidate in the articles coded. Both media outlets yielded 
34 articles containing coverage of either Mark Warner or Ed Gillespie between the dates of October 1, 2014 and 
November 1, 2014. The percentages above represent the percentage out of 34 articles that contained a mention of 
either candidate.           
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Table 2: Political Brand – Brand Differentiators: Senator Mark Warner, 2014 Virginia U.S. 
Senatorial Campaign 
	   	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
Table 3: Political Brand – Brand Differentiators: Ed Gillespie, 2014 Virginia U.S. Senatorial 
Campaign 
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
Bipartisanship 
14% 
Virginia First 
14% 
Leadership 
13% 
Political 
Success 
13% Political Experience 
13% 
Private Sector 
Experience 
13% 
Policy Knowledge/
Strength 
13% 
Opponent Failure 
7% 
Mark Warner Brand - Brand Differentiators 
Bipartisanship 
10% 
Partisan 
20% 
Virginia First 
20% 
Political Experience 
10% 
Policy Knowledge/
Strength 
20% 
Opponent 
Failure 
20% 
Ed Gillespie Brand - Brand Differentiators 
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Table 4: Political Brand – Boundary Conditions: Senator Mark Warner, 2014 Virginia U.S. 
Senatorial Campaign 
    Policy Issue        Emphasis      
 
Economy           High 
Budget            High 
Business           High 
Education           High    
LGBT            Low 
Women’s Rights           High 
Government Accountability     High 
Jobs            High 
Military/Veterans                      High 
Senior Issues                              Low 
Energy/Environment            Low 
Rural Virginia           Low 
Income Inequality                     Low 
Immigration                               Low 
Inequality            High 
National Security           Low 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Political Brand – Boundary Conditions: Ed Gillespie, 2014 Virginia U.S. Senatorial 
Campaign 
    Policy Issue        Emphasis      
 
Economy           High 
Health Care           High 
Budget            High 
Business           High    
Education           High 
Government Accountability     High 
Jobs            High 
Military/Veterans                      Low 
Energy/Environment            High 
Rural Virginia           High 
Income Inequality                     High 
Immigration                               Low 
Inequality            High 
National Security           Low 
 
 
Note: The amount of emphasis either candidate placed on a certain boundary condition was determined through the 
preliminary inductive measurement of each candidate’s brand through the texts crafted by the official campaign (see 
page 24). If the boundary condition was mentioned in only one text, it received a rating of ‘Low’ emphasis. If the 
boundary condition was mentioned in both texts, it received a rating of ‘High’ emphasis.   
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Table 6: Brand Differentiators in News Coverage of 2014 Virginia U.S. Senatorial Campaign 
     Mark Warner   Ed Gillespie 
 
News Outlet/Brand Differentiator            Percent     Number       Percent    Number   Total  
         
Richmond Times-Dispatch   
Bipartisanship            41.18          14           23.08           6      15 
Partisan            35.29          12                         69.23         18      22 
Virginia First            23.53                     8                         26.92           7        11 
Leadership            29.41                   10             0.00           0      10 
Political Success            11.76                     4                           0.00                     0         4 
Political Experience           44.12                   15                         46.15                   12      20 
Private Sector Experience           5.88                     2                           7.69                     2         3 
Policy Knowledge/Strength       29.41                   10                         11.54                     3      10 
Opponent Failure           44.12            15                        50.00                    13      14 
 
Washington Post    
Bipartisanship            40.00           12                  22.22            6      14 
Partisan             56.67                    17           48.15          13          23        
Virginia First            33.33                    10           18.52            5       11 
Leadership              3.33                      1             0.00            0         1 
Political Success            40.00           12             11.11                    3      14  
Political Experience                   66.67                    20                          37.04                  10      23 
Private Sector Experience           3.33              1                           3.70                    1        2 
Policy Knowledge/Strength       20.00                      6                            3.70                    1        7 
Opponent Failure            36.67            11                          59.26                  16     19 
 
 
Table 7: Boundary Conditions in News Coverage of 2014 Virginia U.S. Senatorial Campaign 
     Mark Warner   Ed Gillespie 
 
News Outlet/Brand Differentiator            Percent     Number       Percent    Number   Total 
         
Richmond Times-Dispatch   
Economy            17.65            6           34.62           9      11 
Health Care            35.29          12                         26.92           7      12 
Budget             20.59                     7                         11.54           3          8 
Business            11.76                     4            11.54           3        6 
Education              5.88                     2                           7.69                    2            3 
LGBT             14.71                     5                          11.54                   3        5 
Jobs               8.82              3                         19.23                    5        7 
Military/Veterans             2.94             1              3.85           1        2 
Senior Issues              5.88             2                           3.85           1        2 
Energy/Environment           17.65                     8                         15.38           4          7 
Rural Virginia              5.88                     2             3.85            1        2 
Income Inequality             5.88                     2                           7.69                     2         3 
Immigration              2.94                     1                           7.69                     2        2 
National Security           20.59                     7                          30.77                    8         9 
 
Washington Post    
Economy              6.67            2           33.33           9        9 
Health Care            30.00            9                           7.41           2      10 
Budget               6.67                     2                           3.70           1          2 
Business              3.33                     1             3.70           1        2 
Education              0.00                     0                           3.70                    1         1 
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LGBT             13.33                     4                           7.41                    2        3 
Women’s Rights              6.67                     2                           3.70                    1         2 
Jobs               0.00             0                         14.81                     4        4 
Military/Veterans             6.67            2              0.00           0        2 
Senior Issues              0.00            0                           3.70           1        1 
Energy/Environment             6.67                     2                          11.11           3          4 
Rural Virginia              3.33                     1             3.70           1        1 
Income Inequality             0.00                      0                          7.41                     2         2 
Immigration              3.33                     1                           7.41                     2        2 
Inequality              3.33                     1                           7.41                     2         2 
National Security             6.67                     2                         22.22                     6         5 
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Appendix	  A:	  Codebook	  
	  
Personality/Professional Qualities 
Bipartisanship Partisan Virginia First Leadership 
Political 
Success Political Experience 
Private Sector 
Experience 
Policy 
Knowledge/ 
Strength Opponent Failure    
      
      
Policy 
Economy Health Care Budget Business Education LGBT 
Women's Rights 
Government 
Accountability Jobs Military/Veterans Senior Issues Energy/Environment 
(Rural Virginia) 
Income 
Inequality Immigration Inequality 
National 
Security  
      
	  
Coding Dictionary 
Personality/Professional Qualities 
Bipartisanship bipartisan across the aisle cross party lines 
worked with 
member of 
opposing party 
partnership with 
member of opposing 
party 
  moderate  independent work together 
bucked 
leadership 
stood up 
to/disagreed with 
affiliated party 
Partisan affiliated party 
worked with 
member of 
affiliated party 
campaigned for 
affiliated party or 
member 
partnership 
with member 
of affiliated 
party 
criticize opposing 
party 
Virginia First Virginia first 
Virginia-focused 
legislation 
accomplishments 
for Virginia prosperity Virginia jobs 
  taxpayers voice for Virginia        
Leadership 
sponsored 
legislation 
led 
group/organization build consensus 
solve 
problems Senate leader 
Political Success 
passed 
legislation build consensus solve problems record solutions 
Political Experience  
elected to 
[political 
position] 
served as [political 
position] 
worked as [role 
in politics] public service voice in Washington 
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Private Sector 
Experience 
worked in 
business started a business 
succeded in 
business investments 
apply business 
experience to 
politics 
  pro-business entrepreneur        
Policy Knowledge/ 
Strength 
sponsored 
legislation 
co-sponsored 
legislation 
introduced 
legislation 
solve 
problems   
Opponent Failure 
criticize 
opponent 
criticize opposing 
party failed legislation 
opponent is 
partisan better direction 
  
hold 
accountable         
      
Policy 
Economy prosperity turmoil new jobs growth gas prices 
 taxes 
American 
companies tax code 
financial 
burden rising prices 
  squeeze consumer costs       
Health Care Obamacare health care affordable care patients accessible care 
  insurance doctors       
Budget deficits debt surplus fiscal 
government 
spending 
  
balanced 
budget balance sheet save [money]     
Business start-ups innovation entrepreneurship 
regulation/red 
tape small business 
  investment 
businesses 
grow/thrive 
business 
taxes/corporate 
tax 
American 
companies   
Education student loans public schools 
college/ 
university K-12 charter schools 
  children education funding future generation     
LGBT 
sexual 
orientation marriage equality discrimination     
Women's Rights 
women-
focused policy abortion birth control 
women's 
health   
Government 
Accountability transparency accountability 
government 
spending     
Jobs new jobs create jobs bring jobs unemployed hire 
  kill jobs American jobs       
Military/Veterans military veterans 
served the 
country 
Veterans 
Administration 
(V-A) military families 
  
military 
funding benefits       
Senior Issues Social Medicare    
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Security 
Energy/Environment off-shore climate change 
coal; oil; natural 
gas 
alternative 
energy renewable energy 
 EPA Virginia coast natural resources foreign energy carbon tax 
  cap-and-trade 
Keystone XL 
pipeline drilling 
carbon 
emission   
Rural Virginia rural Virginia broadband coal 
manufacturing 
jobs 
equal [when 
discussing Va. 
Citizens] 
  
fair [when 
discussing Va. 
Citizens] 
opportunity [when 
discussing Va. 
Citizens]       
Income Inequality Wall Street taxes housing finance take-home pay middle class 
 poor poverty increase wages loophole upward mobility 
  food stamps welfare       
Immigration 
immigration 
reform border immigrant U.S. citizen   
Inequality opportunity fair shot       
National Security threats safety terrorism     
 
 
